With the increased availability of prenatal testing across the United States and Europe, the birthrate of children with Down syndrome has significantly decreased. In the U.S., 67% of fetuses with Down syndrome are terminated. In Iceland, however, nearly 100% of these fetuses have been terminated since the introduction of prenatal testing in the early 2000s. In 2009, three total children with Down syndrome were born in Iceland.
Naturally, certain groups have taken issue with this phenomenon, especially anti-abortion advocates. In a story published by CBS NEWS, Helga Sol Olafsdottir (a counselor for women pregnant with chromosomal abnormalities) said:
"We don't look at abortion as a murder. We look at it as a thing that we ended. We ended a possible life that may have had a huge complication... preventing suffering for the child and for the family. And I think that is more right than seeing it as a murder -- that's so black and white. Life isn't black and white. Life is grey."
The purpose of this post is not to refute abortion or present generalized “Pro-life” stances. Rather, I intend to question whether “preventing suffering for the child and for the family” is sufficient to justify a prenatal Down syndrome termination rate of nearly 100%.
By stating that it is justified to end the possibility of a life to prevent future suffering, one is in essence making a utilitarian argument. Utilitarianism states that one ought to do that which maximizes happiness and minimizes suffering. Terminating a fetus with Down syndrome, according to Helga Olafsdottir at least, is an attempt to minimize suffering.
Unfortunately, this utilitarian justification for terminating fetuses with chromosomal abnormalities fails to account for the happiness a disabled fetus could eventually experience. For a utilitarian to argue that a fetus ought to be terminated, that fetus’ existence would have to eventually cause more suffering than happiness. To defend this, one would need to assert that almost every individual with Down syndrome lives a life with negative overall value or happiness.
As most people would agree, claiming that a disabled person’s life has a negative value would be simply awful. However, by terminating nearly every fetus with chromosomal abnormalities, Iceland asserts that their lives are not worth living or not worth being supported.
This particular pitfall only occurs if the justification for terminating the pregnancy is to prevent suffering. Without the ability to quantify how much happiness the eventual child could experience, it is impossible to know whether a life will have more pain than joy. The scope of this post is not to determine whether abortion is morally permissible, nor does it refute other potential reasons to terminate a pregnancy. However, the (almost) universal termination of fetuses with Down syndrome denies the potential fulfillment they could experience despite the suffering. Anyone who has ever met a child with Down syndrome would have a hard time arguing that they don’t seem happy. So, why does Iceland assume that their pain makes their lives not worth living?
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